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Abstract
This paper sets up a rational inattention model for the route choice
problem in a stochastic network where travelers face random travel
time. Previous research has assumed that travelers incorporate all pro-
vided information without effort. This study assumes that information
is costly and that travelers rationally choose how much information to
acquire prior to choosing route. We begin with a single traveler and
then extend the model to heterogeneous travelers where rationally inat-
tentive user equilibrium (RIUE) is achieved. From the perspective of
a single traveler, more information always reduces the impact of travel
time variability and increases the probability of choosing a less costly
route. However, in RIUE, more information may reduce the social
welfare in some scenarios.
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1 Introduction
The route choice behavior of travelers has been a research topic for many
years. Early deterministic network equilibrium models (Wardrop, 1952) deal
with constant link capacity and travel demand. In reality, travelers com-
monly face uncertain travel time with randomness resulting from either the
demand side or the supply side in congested transport networks. Stochas-
tic equilibrium models have been proposed to capture network uncertainty,
such as the travel time budget (TTB) model and the mean-excess travel time
(METT) (e.g., Daganzo and Sheffi, 1977; Xu et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2010;
Lo et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011).
To reduce the impact of travel time variability, real life travelers may take
advantage of many information sources, such as radio or TV broadcasting,
websites or real time traffic information apps. Recently, researchers have be-
come increasingly interested in studying the impact of information on travel
behavior (e.g., Paz and Peeta, 2009; Bifulco et al., 2016). Ettema and Tim-
mermans (2006) proposed a model that analytically captures the cost caused
by bias in prior knowledge about travel time distribution and they found that
information can reduce the bias. Based on the quality of information, the
benefits of travel time information vary. Arnott et al. (1991) asked whether
information provision is beneficial for reducing congestion in a route choice
problem. They set up a network of two routes with variable capacity and
investigated the case with no information, perfect information and imperfect
information, respectively, and concluded that imperfect information may be
harmful for the system performance. Similarly, Lindsey et al. (2014) ana-
lyzed the impact of pre-trip information about traffic conditions. They also
inspected cases where information may be welfare-reducing if free-flow travel
costs differ appreciably. Gao (2012) extended the work in a time-dependent
stochastic network and investigated travelers’ adaptive behavior to informa-
tion by formulating the equilibrium as a fixed-point problem. Other works
used agent-based simulation (Wahle et al., 2002), conducted empirical ex-
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periments (Lu et al., 2014; Avineri and Prashker, 2006), modeled route and
mode choice simultaneously (Liu et al., 2017), etc.
In recent years, the emerging technologies of smart phones, mapping soft-
ware, and social media have made a large amount of traffic information avail-
able. Travelers have easy access to real-time traffic information through
Google Map, Waze, Radio, etc. It is natural to assume that the effort to
make use of such information could be negligible. Hence, most of the previ-
ous studies assume that travelers effortlessly incorporate such real-time in-
formation into their travel decisions. To test the validity of this assumption,
we conducted an online survey of 237 drivers belonging to distinct groups
of age, occupation, gender and driving frequency. The questionnaire was
posted on Wechat, a popular social media platform in China. By reward-
ing the participants with a random amount of money between 0.1-5 yuan,
the questionnaire was quickly distributed into different Wechat groups. The
participants were from different provinces of China. More than 65% of them
were in big cities, such as Beijing, Shenzhen, Shanghai,Wuhan, Hong Kong,
etc. The geographic areas of participants are depicted in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Geographic area of participants
We asked them about their frequencies of driving, frequencies of using
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real-time information, and the sources of their real-time information. From
Fig.2, the proportion of drivers who always use real-time traffic information
is only 29%. More than half of the drivers do not often use real-time traffic
information. From Fig.3, the main source of real-time information is mapping
software, followed by radio. Social media such as Wechat, Weibo and Waze
are only mentioned by a small proportion of drivers. As the participants are
mostly from big cities who generally have easier access to real-time traffic
information, we can infer that in rural areas, the use of real-time traffic
information may be even less.
Figure 2: Frequency of using the real-time traffic information
Figure 3: Sources of the real-time traffic information
We further analyzed the usage of real-time traffic information by different
age groups. The results are shown in Fig.4. We can see that the percentage
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of people who always use real-time traffic information decreases with age.
In contrast, the percentage of people who seldom use real-time information
increases with age. We can learn from the survey that young people are more
prone to using real-time information. However, even among the young people,
there is still a large proportion who seldom use real-time traffic information.
Figure 4: The relationship between age and the frequency of using real-time
traffic information
In summary, the survey shows that a substantial amount of travelers do
not make use of real-time traffic information. The reasons, perhaps psy-
chological or behavioral, are captured as information cost in this study. In
addition, even with the latest technology, there are still measurement and
prediction errors, as well as data latency issues, which prevent them from
producing error-free real-time traffic information. This also adds to the cost
of having to process and assess such information for real-time decisions. Pre-
vious research has also showed that the limited human information-processing
capacity induces travelers to only consider information selectively (Hogarth,
1987). In reality, travelers are unlikely to make use of all available infor-
mation as that would require considerable effort, which may outweigh the
potential gains from travel cost reduction. Therefore, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the amount of information to be acquired or taken into account
is a choice in itself. This choice depends on the costs and benefits of infor-
mation acquisition. For different groups of people, the information cost may
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be different. The cost does not only include monetary cost, but also factors
that discourage them from using real-time information.
Recognizing our limited information capacity, Sims (2003) and Sims et al.
(2010) proposed a theoretical framework that takes the choice of information
acquisition into account, which is called the rational inattention model in
micro-economic theory. People choose optimally how much information to
take into account, balancing the cost of information against the gains from
better informed expectations. In this framework, people will neglect some
information with poor reward. The rational inattention model makes it pos-
sible to study analytically how the cost of information processing influences
peoples’ behavior under uncertainty. The model has generated much atten-
tion in economics. Recently, Matejka and McKay (2015) showed that in a
discrete choice setting, the optimal information strategy leads to a multino-
mial logit model, when information is measured using the Shannon entropy.
This is a very attractive result as it provides a bounded rationality founda-
tion for the logit model. Following their work, Caplin et al. (2016) derived
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the solution of rational inattention
model. Martin (2017) and Matějka (2015) adapted this model to strategic
pricing where the consumers have imperfect information. Fosgerau et al.
(2017) extended the framework to provide a bounded rationality foundation
for any ARUM discrete choice model.
Application of the rational inattention model requires the prior infor-
mation of agents to be specified. This is a lesser issue in a transportation
setting such as in Fosgerau and Jiang (2019), who considered the departure
time choice for a rationally inattentive traveler, since the prior may be taken
as the raw unconditional distribution of travel times.
Under the framework of the rational inattention discrete choice model,
this study investigates travelers’ route choice behavior with imperfect knowl-
edge about traffic conditions. The paper makes the following contributions.
First, the rational inattention model is introduced to the route choice prob-
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lem. Unlike previous research where the information is exogenously given,
this study enables the travelers to choose their information strategies. Route
choice may be interpreted broadly to include also choice of departure time,
destination and transport mode. Second, our model can be viewed as a gen-
eralized model for studying network equilibrium with imperfect information,
where the situations with no information and perfect information are incor-
porated as extreme cases. Third, consideration sets arise endogenously in this
model; they are not ad hoc fixes to a computational problem of the modeler,
but behavior that arises because travelers economize on information. Fourth,
this paper shows that information may have a large impact on travelers’ con-
sideration set and on their probability of choosing the optimal route. We
begin with the route choice problem for a single traveler and then extend
our model to the context of user equilibrium. This study demonstrates that
the rational inattention model can be used to study the collective behavior
under equilibrium formulated as a fixed-point problem. Fifth, the concept
of rationally inattentive user equilibrium (RIUE) is proposed to model the
user equilibrium in network with heterogeneous information cost. The im-
pact of imperfect information is examined from both the perspective of the
individual traveler and the whole transportation system.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the rational
inattention model. We begin with a brief introduction of the general idea
and properties of the rational inattention model. The relationship between
the signal, route choice and the travel time cost is explained. The total
individual travel cost is formulated as the sum of the expected travel time
cost and the information cost. Section 3 explores the impact of information
on the route choice of a single traveler facing travel time variability. In
this setting, the travel time of each link is random. The traveler chooses
an information strategy to minimize the total travel cost. His choice will
not affect the travel time distribution of the network. Section 4 formulates
rationally inattentive user equilibrium (RIUE) in a stochastic network with
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heterogeneous travelers. In a numerical example, we investigate the impact
of information from both the perspectives of social welfare and travelers.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The rational inattention model
We will set up a rational inattention model for the traveler’s route choice
problem from the perspective of a single traveler. This section lays out the
generic model, which is then specialized to the route choice setting in Section
3.
The state of the traffic system is random and belongs to a finite set of
possible states Ω, where ω ∈ Ω denotes a generic state. This is a convenient
simplification; it is not restrictive as any continuous travel time distribution
may be approximated arbitrarily well by a sufficiently fine discretization. The
traveler has prior knowledge about the traffic states encoded in a probability
distribution across states p(ω). The action available to the traveler is the
choice of route and the set of available routes is denoted A. The cost function
c : A×Ω→ R assigns a cost to each action in each state. The random state
ω is unobserved by travelers prior to their choice of action.
The traveler’s decision problem has two stages. In the first stage, each
traveler chooses an information strategy in the form of a signal Z: a random
variable that carries some information about the state. A perfectly informa-
tive signal is a one-to-one function of the state, while an uninformative signal
is independent of the state. The choice of signal Z is associated with a cost
that increases with the informativeness of the signal; we make this explicit
below. The traveler trades off his information cost against his expected travel
cost in the second stage. The information cost includes any effort made by
the travelers and not just monetary costs. Although information is becoming
more easily available due to the development of information technology, some
travelers still do not take the time or effort to search and process informa-
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tion. As we discuss below, we will use the Shannon entropy to measure the
amount of information.
The signal is described by the posterior belief, and the posterior distri-
bution of the state is conditional on the value of the signal p(Ω|Z). The
posterior belief is related to the prior through Bayes’ law:
p(ω) =
∑
z∈Z
p(ω|z)p(z) (1)
In the second stage, the traveler observes a realization of the random
signal. With that information, he1 chooses the optimal route, his action,
based on his posterior belief. Since the signal is random, that makes also the
action a random variable.
An important property of the rational inattention model is that it is not
necessary to consider the signal explicitly. The signal may be thought of
as being implicit in the choice. The reason is the following. If different
values of the signal lead to the same action, then the signal is inefficient:
if the traveler chose an alternative signal that did not distinguish between
such values then the alternative signal would have lower information cost, but
would lead to the same actions. This argument shows that the traveler would
choose a signal where different values of the signal correspond to different
actions. Then it is no loss of generality to simply identify the signal with
the action. The signal may be taken just as indicating which action to
take. It is an important advantage of the rational inattention model that
the traveler’s choice of information strategy can be considered as implicit in
the dependence of choices on the state. Then restrictive assumptions about
particular information technologies can be avoided. This is important as in
reality there are many different information sources that travelers can use.
The information strategy can then be represented by the conditional prob-
ability matrix P (A|Ω). Write p (a|ω) = P (A = a|Ω = ω) as short-hand for
1Gender of representative person chosen at random.
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the conditional probability of choosing action a in state ω and let
p (a) = P (A = a) =
∑
ω∈Ω
p (a|ω) p (ω) (2)
be the unconditional probability of choosing action a. This matrix summa-
rizes how the traveler incorporates information about the state in his action.
Figure 5: Decision process
Fig. 5 illustrates the relationship between state Ω, signal Z and action
A. The solid arrows represent the underlying decision-making process. The
traveler first choose an information strategy. According to the information
strategy, he receives the signal Z containing information about the state and
then he chooses his action. As explained, the signal is implicit represented
in the joint distribution of state and action. The dashed line represents the
simplified representation of the information strategy.
We now discuss the cost of information. The simplest measure of infor-
mation is the mutual Shannon information, which is defined in terms of the
Shannon entropy. If a discrete random variable Z has the probability dis-
tribution p (), then its Shannon entropy H (Z) = −E[log p (Z)] captures the
amount of information encoded in Z.
The mutual Shannon information between random variables A and Ω is
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by definition
I (A; Ω) = H (A)−H (A|Ω)
=
∑
a∈A
p(a) log
1
p(a)
−
∑
a∈A,ω∈Ω
p(a, ω) log
1
p(a|ω)
= −
∑
a∈A
p (a) log p (a) +
∑
ω∈Ω,a∈A
p (a|ω) p (ω) log p (a|ω)
The traveler then chooses the information strategy P (A|Ω) to minimize
his total expected cost, which is the sum of his expected travel cost and his
information cost,
Λ (P ) = E (c (A,Ω)) + λI (A,Ω) , (3)
The first term is the expected travel cost with the set of state contingent
choice probabilities. The second term is the total information cost, where λ
is the cost per unit of information and I (A,Ω) is the amount of information
about the state comprised in the action. The information cost involves not
only monetary cost but also the time and effort spent by the travelers in
acquiring and processing the information. The emergence of smartphones
and services such as Google Maps have reduced the cost of information but
it still requires effort from travelers to incorporate this information.
Before going into the details of the traveler’s solution to this optimization
problem, we can make some initial observations about the two extreme cases
of complete and no information. The case of complete information arises if
information is free, λ = 0. In that case, the traveler is able to choose the
shortest path in every state, i.e. a∗(ω) = argmina c(a|ω).
In the polar case when information is infinitely expensive, the traveler will
choose not to obtain any information therefore his information cost I(A,Ω)
is zero, which implies that his action is independent of the state. In other
words, the traveler makes the same route choice every day. In that case, a∗(ω)
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does not depend on the state ω and the traveler chooses route to minimize
the expected travel cost across all states, i.e. a∗ = argminaE[c(a|ω)]. The
uninformed traveler is not able to accommodate variability in travel times
by adapting his route choice.
3 Route choice for a rationally inattentive trav-
eler
The mathematical derivation of the solution and properties of the rational
inattention model have been studied extensively (e.g., Matejka and McKay,
2015; Caplin et al., 2016). This paper is the first to cast the route choice prob-
lem in terms of rational inattention. In this section, some general properties
of the rational inattention model are applied to the route choice problem of a
single traveler without considering user equilibrium. We examine the impact
of information on the size of the consideration set and the distribution of
choices across routes. The traveler’s total expected cost can be written out
in terms of the conditional probabilities p(a|ω) as
Λ (P ) =
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
a∈A
p(a|ω)p(ω)c(a|ω)+λ
[
−
∑
a∈A
p(a) log p(a) +
∑
ω∈Ω,a∈A
p (a|ω) p (ω) log p (a|ω)
]
(4)
c(a|ω) =
∑
i
c(i|ω)ǫai (5)
∑
a
p(a|ω) = 1 (6)
∑
a
p(a|ω) ≥ 0 (7)
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where c(i|ω) and c(a|ω) are the link travel time and the path travel time
respectively. Let the link-path incidence matrix have generic element ǫai ,
which is 1 if link i is on path a and 0 otherwise. The traveler minimizes his
total expected cost subject to (5)-(7). The first order condition for (4) yields
p (a|ω) =
exp(−c(a|ω)/λ)p(a)∑
a′
exp(−c(a|ω)/λ)p (a′)
. (8)
The existence of the solution of (8) can be proved using the Brouwer fixed-
point theorem. However, if there are identical options in the considera-
tion sets, the solution might not be unique, we will show the case of non-
uniqueness in the numerical example. It is immediately clear that (8) has the
form of a logit model, except that the exponential negative costs are weighted
by the unconditional probabilities p(a). The unconditional probabilities p(a)
depend in turn on the conditional probabilities according to (2). Finding the
conditional and unconditional probabilities then entails solving a fixed point
problem, where the presence of the weights p(a) has the effect of amplifying
variations in the state-dependent costs c(a|ω). The conditional probability
p(a|ω) tends to be large if the unconditional probability p(a) is large, which
happens if route a is generally attractive across states.
In cases where p(a) is constant across the choice set, then these terms
cancel out of the expression for the conditional choice probabilities and the
standard logit model results. Otherwise, if the number of states and actions
are sufficiently small, then it is possible to derive the solution analytically. In
general, however, the solution to (8) and (2) can only be found numerically.
An important thing to note is that some unconditional probabilities may
be zero. Clearly, if p(a) = 0 then also all the conditional probabilities p(a|ω)
are zero. Such an option is not chosen in any state. Zero probabilities occur
naturally and often in the rational inattention discrete choice model due to
the reinforcing impact of the unconditional probabilities on the conditional
probabilities in (8). It is useful to define the consideration set as those options
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B = {a ∈ A|p(a) > 0} that are chosen with positive probability. Proposition
1 gives a sufficient and quite intuitive condition for some paths to be omitted
from the consideration set. The condition is not necessary: paths can be
excluded from the consideration set even if they are not dominated by some
other option. We will see examples of this in our numerical results below.
Proposition 1. (Matejka and McKay, 2015) Suppose that option a is dom-
inated by option d in the sense that ∀ω ∈ Ω : c (a|ω) ≥ c (d|ω) with strict
inequality for some ω. Then p (a) = 0.
Caplin et al. (2016) derived a necessary and sufficient condition for decid-
ing which options belong to the consideration set and provided an algorithm
for the solution.
Proposition 2. (Caplin et al., 2016) The information strategy P (A|Ω) is
optimal if and only if for all a ∈ A,
∑
ω∈Ω
exp (−c(a|ω)/λ) p (ω)∑
a′
exp (−c(a′|ω)/λ) p (a′)
≤ 1 (9)
with equality if p(a) > 0.
To compute p(a), a ∈ A, we begin with an initial guess for p0(a), a ∈ A.
The initial guess is iteratively updated until convergence with the next con-
ditional probability vector computed from the previous iteration according
to
Pl+1(a) =
∑
ω∈Ω
exp (−c(a|ω)/λ) p (ω)∑
a′
exp (−c(a′|ω)/λ) p (a′ ∈ A)
Pl(a). (10)
The iteration of (10) will converge when the conditions in Proposition 2 are
satisfied (under some chosen precision). In each iteration, the term in the
bracket of (10) indicates whether the Pl(a) needs to be raised or dropped. The
options with Pl(a) < ǫ is set to be 0. The solution generated by this algorithm
is optimal if the initial consideration set with P0(a) > 0 is sufficiently large
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that it includes all possible choice options. In our study, as we can enumerate
all the possible paths, the solution generated by the algorithm is guaranteed
to be the optimal solution for the rational inattention problem.
Let Pˆ = P (A|Ω) be the optimally chosen information strategy. Following
the proof in Caplin et al. (2016) we substitute (8) into (4) to obtain
Λ
(
Pˆ
)
= −λ
∑
ω∈Ω
p(ω) log
[∑
a∈A
p(a) exp(−c(a|ω)/λ)
]
. (11)
This expression generalizes the logsum from the classic logit model.
Using the envelope theorem on the payoff (3), with the optimally chosen
information strategy, we immediately obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The traveler’s optimal total travel cost increases with the
unit information cost, i.e.
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂λ
> 0.
Proposition 3 is consistent with the intuition that information is helpful
to reduce the total travel cost from the perspective of a single traveler. If
the unit information cost is increased, then the traveler will acquire less
information and be less able to adjust his choice of path to take varying
travel times into account. Therefore his expected total travel cost increases.
3.1 Numerical study
In this section, we present the result of a numerical study to illustrate the
behavior of a single rationally inattentive traveler facing a network with
uncertain link travel times. The example network is shown in Fig. 6. There
are 6 nodes and 9 links in the example network. The origin is node 1 and
the destination is node 6. For simplicity, we assume each link has two states,
congested and non-congested. The two states occur with equal probability
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Figure 6: A simple network for illustration
and the links are independent. There are then 29 possible states. The traveler
chooses between 5 feasible paths from the origin to the destination, as listed
in Table 2. There is no dominant relationship among the paths. Each path
is a shortest path in some state.
Table 1: Enumeration of paths
Path ID Node sequence Possible values Expected cost
1 1-2-3-6 40, 47, 50(2), 57(2), 60, 67 53.5
2 1-2-5-6 37, 47, 49, 52, 59, 62, 64, 74 55.5
3 1-5-6 30, 45, 50, 65 47.5
4 1-4-5-6 30, 40, 45(2), 55(2), 60, 70 50
5 1-2-6 40, 50, 60, 70 55
The optimal choice probabilities for the rationally inattentive traveler
depend on the unit information cost λ. To illustrate its impact, Fig.7 depicts
the optimal behavior of the traveler with different values of λ. For each
path, we calculate three probabilities. P (SP = i) denotes the unconditional
probability of the path to be the shortest path; P (A = i) is the unconditional
probability of choosing path i before receiving the signal; P (SP = i|A = i) is
the posterior probability of a path to be the shortest path (SP) conditioned
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Figure 7: Probability distributions for each path
on it being chosen. Among these three, P (SP = i) is determined by the
distribution of Ω, which can be viewed as a characteristic of each path, thus
is not affected by the value of λ.
First, we compare the size of the consideration set B = {a ∈ A|p(a) > 0}
for different values of λ. When information is cheap, λ = 1, the consid-
eration set comprises all the alternatives, |B| = 5, which means that each
path is chosen with a positive probability. At λ = 5, path 2, the path with
the smallest unconditional probability at λ = 1, is dropped from the con-
sideration set, which now has a size of |B| = 4. The unconditional choice
probability of path 1 is also very small. As λ increases to 12, path 1 is
dropped from the consideration set. At λ = 20, only paths 3 and 4 remain
in the consideration set. In the extreme case where λ =∞, travelers will not
acquire any information and they choose path 3 every day, as that path has
the smallest expected cost in the absence of information. In this case where
there is no trend of dominant relationship between each path, the size of the
consideration set decreases with the unit information cost. In this example,
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Figure 8: Posterior probability of choosing the shortest path
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Figure 9: Travel cost for different λ
as information becomes more expensive, travelers will limit their attention
to a smaller number of paths, paying more attention to paths that have a
higher probability of yielding the least cost.
Another observation from this example is that the posterior probability
of choosing a better path decreases with information cost. When λ = 1, the
posterior probability of each alternative to be the shortest path is almost 1,
i.e. the traveler is almost always able to choose the shortest path. When
λ = 20, there are only two options in the consideration set, and the posterior
probability for each chosen path to be the shortest path is less than 0.5.
Fig.8 shows the overall probability of choosing the shortest path. When
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Figure 10: Information cost for different λ
λ = 0, the information is free and travelers get perfect information. They can
choose the shortest path in each state with 100% probability. In Fig.8, the
posterior probability decreases sharply for λ < 10 and then decreases more
slowly. This means that the marginal effect of the unit information cost is
large when then information is cheap. Fig. 9 exhibits this characteristic as
well. We can see the total cost and the travel time cost increases fast at
small values of λ and then the slope becomes small. Fosgerau and Jiang
(2019) find similar results. It may be due to the sensitivity of the amount
of information to the information cost. When λ is relatively small, travelers
acquire rich information and are thus very sensitive to states. In each state,
the conditional probability p(a|ω) of the non-optimal paths are close to 0.
Due to the logarithm in the expression for the Shannon entropy, it is sensitive
near 0. Therefore, the amount of information acquired decreases sharply in
small λ, which leads to its large marginal effect on both the travel costs and
on the overall posterior probability of choosing the shortest path. The blue
and red lines in Fig. 9 represent the travel costs without information and
with perfect information respectively, which are the boundary values of travel
costs for the rational inattention model. In this example, the information may
reduce up to 20% of travel cost compared to no-information scenario.
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Fig.10 shows the optimal information cost at different values of λ. The
optimal information cost is zero when information is free or when information
is so expensive that no information is obtained. It is positive in between,
which makes the optimal information cost a non-monotonic function of λ. For
small λ, a change in λ dominates the change in the quantity of information
acquired. The opposite happens for large λ. Comparing the total travel cost,
travel time cost and information cost in Fig.9 and Fig.10, we find that the
information cost only accounts for a small percentage of the total travel cost.
However, it affects the route choice behavior and the travel cost to a great
extent.
Now consider for a moment that there exists a path 6 that is a dupli-
cate of path 3. The travel time of the two paths are exactly the same in
all states, i.e. p(3|ω) = p(6|ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω. We can think, perhaps, that we
account separately for two parallel lanes on path 3. As p(a|ω) has a logit-like
form, one may worry that the model will produce unrealistic results result-
ing from the IIA property of logit model. However, Matejka and McKay
(2015) proved that the duplicate actions are treated as a single action. Our
numerical studies verified that adding a duplicate path does not affect the
probability distributions of other paths. Compared to the case without the
duplicate path, we have p′(3)+ p′(6) = p(3), where p′(a) is the unconditional
probability of path a after adding the duplicate path. Since the traveler is
now indifferent between path 3 and 6, there are infinite solutions to (3), as
long as the sum of p(3) and p(6) is fixed. This result is a general property
of the rational inattention logit model (Matejka and McKay, 2015) and is an
important reason to prefer the rational inattention logit model over the plain
logit model.
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4 User Equilibrium for rationally inattentive
travelers
Having considered the case of a single rationally inattentive traveler, we
now proceed to consider the more complicated case of user equilibrium with
rationally inattentive travelers.
4.1 Problem formulation for a generalized network with
heterogeneous travelers
In Section 3, the link travel time was assumed to be independent of the route
choice of the traveler. In this section, we generalize the model to a group of
travelers in a stochastic network. The link travel time depends on the traffic
flow and the realized capacity of the network. The randomness comes from
the capacity of the network. The set of states Ω now includes all possible
realization of capacity on each link in the network. The total demand from
origin O to destination D is N . Each day, travelers choose between the paths,
denoted as a ∈ A, where A is the set of paths. Travelers are treated as a
continuum, with every zero mass traveler making choices taking the choices
of everybody else as given. The state-dependent travel time on each link is
the prior knowledge of travelers. As the travelers do not consider the choices
of others when making the choice, only in equilibrium their prior knowledge
is consistent with the actual travel time they experienced.
For the sake of comparison, we introduce two extreme information sce-
narios in addition to the general rationally inattentive scenario. In the first
extreme scenario, travelers have zero information cost. In this case, travelers
obtain perfect information and the problem degenerates day by day to the
deterministic model. On each day, the paths with positive flows will have
the same cost, which is not larger than the cost on the unchosen paths. In
the second extreme scenario, information is infinitely expensive and travelers
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obtain no information. They choose among paths based only on their prior
knowledge of p(Ω). In equilibrium, the expected cost is constant across the
chosen paths and not larger than the cost of the unchosen paths. However,
since the realized capacities vary every day, the actual cost on each day may
be different on the two paths.
The general case is in between these extremes. Travelers have positive
and finite information cost. As there is a continuum of travelers, each indi-
vidual traveler has no impact on the equilibrium and therefore has the same
objective function (4) as the single individual traveler.
Assume there are m types of travelers with heterogeneous unit informa-
tion cost {λ1, λ2, ..., λm}. The mass of type k travelers is Nk. Travelers with
smaller λk have cheaper access to information. The information cost has
impact on the behavior of travelers and in return changes the impact of in-
formation itself. The rationally inattentive user equilibrium (RIUE) is then
formulated through the following equations.
pk (a|ω) =
exp(−c(a|ω)/λk)pk(a)∑
a′
exp(−c(a′|ω)/λk)pk (a′)
(12)
pk(a) =
∑
ω∈Ω
pk(a|ω)p(ω) (13)
f(a|ω) =
∑
k
Nkpk (a|ω) (14)
f(i|ω) =
∑
a
f(a|ω)ǫai (15)
c(a|ω) =
∑
i
c(i|ω)ǫai (16)
We note the following properties of RIUE:
(i) Travellers with the same λk have the same generalized travel cost.
(ii) The state-dependent link flow is deterministic. Each day travelers get
22
information about the traffic state according to their information strategies.
Every state has a specific equilibrium so the link flow pattern changes from
day to day depending on the realized state.
(iii) Travellers’ prior knowledge of the state-dependent travel time is the same
as the equilibrium travel time. Before the equilibrium is achieved, the state-
dependent travel time, which is treated as the prior knowledge of travelers,
is not the same as the true travel time travellers experience, because each
traveler makes route choice without considering the route choices of others.
Only in equilibrium, the prior knowledge of travel time is unbiased.
The case with homogeneous travellers is a special case of heterogeneous
travellers if we set k = 1. If travellers have same unit information cost, in
equilibrium their total travel costs are the same. Generally, pk(a|ω) distin-
guishes between different values of λ.
Finally, we define
c(i|ω) = t0i
(
1 + β(
f(i|ω)
s(i|ω)
)γ
)
(17)
where t0i is the free flow travel time of link i and ni is the traffic flow on link
i. s(i|ω) is the realized capacity of path i under state ω, which is the source
of randomness.
We establish that the equations defining the RIUE always have a solution.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium defined by equations (12)-(17) exists.
Proof. Equations (14) - (17) define the cost matrix c(A|Ω) as a continuous
function of the conditional choice probability matrixes pk(A|Ω). Similarly,
(13) defines the unconditional probabilities as a continuous function of the
conditional choice probability matrixes. Then (12) is a continuous fixed point
equation on the convex and compact set of conditional choice probability
matrixes. By the Brouwer fixed-point theorem, the solution exists.
We are unable to prove that the equilibrium is unique, however. The
uniqueness condition, if exists, needs to be established in a future study.
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Proposition 5. The generalized travel cost of travelers with cheaper unit
information cost is smaller than those with larger unit information cost, i.e.
if λk < λj, then Λk < Λj.
Proof. In equilibrium, the state-specific cost on each path is the same for all
traveler types. Travelers with different λ have distinct information strategy
and generalized cost. Thus, Proposition 3 directly leads to the statement in
Proposition 5.
The problem of user equilibrium in transportation network has been stud-
ied for many decades. There are many pioneer research on deterministic user
equilibrium (DUE) (Daskin, 1985). Since DUE cannot capture uncertainty
and randomness in reality, researchers have developed stochastic user equi-
librium (SUE) models which consider the perception error of the travel cost
(e.g., Bell, 1995; Yang, 1997). Unlike the general path-based SUE models,
Fosgerau et al. (2013) and Mai et al. (2015) proposed the link-based recursive
logit (RL) and the nested recursive logit (NRL) model. In SUE, the actual
travel time is still deterministic. The reliability-based stochastic user equilib-
rium (RSUE) deals with the network with uncertain travel time (e.g., Shao
et al., 2006; Lam et al., 2008; Lo et al., 2006). Recently, researchers have
proposed the notion of bounded rational user equilibrium (BRUE) (Di et al.,
2013), assuming the travel cost differences of the chosen paths are within
an indifference band of travelers. RIUE may be viewed as a kind of BRUE
model in which travelers are imperfectly informated. To better understand
the proposed RIUE, the comparison of the mentioned models are listed in
Table 2.
The social welfare is measured by the total travel cost of all the travelers,
including the information cost for the rationally inattentive travelers. The
information cost for the uninformed travelers is zero.
Having a model that explicitly includes information allows us to answer
questions related to the provision of information. Intuition suggests that
making information more easily accessible (and hence cheaper to acquire) will
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Table 2: Comparison of UE models
Model Stochastic network Information Perceived error
DUE No No Yes
RSUE No Yes/No No
RL No No Yes
NRL No No Yes
BRUE No No No
RIUE Yes Yes No
be welfare improving. However, Lindsey et al. (2014) have shown through
counter-examples that information is not always welfare-improving since con-
gestion externalities may increase. It is then of interest to see if this conclu-
sion remains in the rational inattention model. The conclusion may change
since the rational inattention model endogenizes the acquisition of informa-
tion and the cost of information is part of the welfare measure. Following
the earlier literature, we investigate the issue by means of stylized examples.
4.2 Solution algorithm
In this paper, we adopt the Method of Successive Average (MSA) to find the
solution. MSA has been widely used for solving traffic assignment problems
due to its simplicity and robustness (e.g., Chen et al., 2014; Yao et al., 2014;
Liu et al., 2009). The convergence of MSA is guaranteed if a proper step size
is chosen (Blum, 1954). This study adopts the classical step size 1/n, where
n is the iteration number. The procedure is as follows:
Step 0: Initialization. For each OD pair and each type of traveler,
set an initial value of p(0)={p(a|ω)}, which is the conditional probability of
choosing each path. Compute the path flow f(0).
Step 1: Search direction. Update the path travel times c(n) based on
f(n) according to (12)-(13). Calculate the new p˜(n).
Step 2: Update. p(n+ 1) = p(n) + a ∗ (p˜(n)− p(n)), where a = 1/n.
Step 3: Termination criterion. If ||p˜(n)− p(n)|| < ǫ, then terminate;
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otherwise, go to Step 1.
4.3 Numerical example
The numerical example employs a two-link network, similar to those used
by Lindsey et al. (2014) and Emmerink et al. (1998) for studying the im-
pact of information. Our example differs from the previous in the following
two ways: (1) In the rational inattention model, the information strategy is
endogenously chosen by travelers; (2) We allow traveler heterogeneity.
4.3.1 A freeway and an arterial road
Table 3: Parameters used in the numerical example
Variables Symbol Value
Travel time of path 1 tf 15
Free-flow travel time of path 2 t0 5
Maximum capacity of path 2 Smax2 40
Travel demand N 150
Degradable parameter θ 0.4
Unit information cost λ 10
Percentage of uninformed travelers δ 0.5
Parameters for BPR function β 0.15
γ 4
Consider a network with two links, each corresponding to a path as shown
in 11. Path 1 is a safe path and path 2 is a risky path with random capac-
ity. More specifically, path 1 is the freeway with deterministic travel time tf
which does not change with traffic flow. Path 2 is an arterial road with BPR
cost function (17). The path 2 has stochastic capacity S2 and free flow travel
time t0. The example is constructed such that one path does not dominate
the other. The parameters are listed in Table 3. The distribution of S2 is
assumed to be uniform. The possible values of S2 define the states. The
probability distribution of Ω, p(Ω), is known to travelers. Emmerink et al.
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(1998) investigated the impact of imperfect information on a one-link network
with elastic demand. They adopted a linear demand and cost functions. In
this example, the freeway is introduced to investigate elastic demand on the
arterial road without specific assumptions about the demand function. The
Figure 11: Degradable network
total demand is N . There are two types of travelers, with imperfect infor-
mation and without information, respectively. The proportion of uninformed
travelers is δ.
Fig. 12 shows the conditional probability of choosing the risky path in
the different states. The uninformed travelers equalize the expected travel
cost of the two paths and the probability of choosing each path does not
vary with the state. In contrast, the rationally inattentive travelers acquire
information that leads them to increase their probability of choosing the risky
path in states when the capacity is high.
The right panel of Fig.12 shows the travel time on the risky path in the
different states. We observe that the travel time on the risky path decreases
with capacity even though the demand increases. The uninformed travelers
take into account an expected travel cost on the risky path that in equilibrium
is equal to the cost on the safe path, which is 15.
We have calculated the expected travel cost of rationally inattentive trav-
elers and find that their travel time cost is 14.57 and their information cost is
0.21. We can see that the information cost only accounts for a small part of
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Figure 12: Conditional probability and travel cost under different states
the total generalized cost, but it leads to significant changes in the traffic be-
havior. We can link this result to reality, noting that usually it does not take
us much effort to search for some rough information about the traffic states.
However, the information we obtain has a large impact on our behavior.
Fig.13 shows the unconditional probability of choosing the risky path for
different values of λ (left panel) and δ (right panel), where δ is the percent-
age of uninformed travelers. In the left panel, δ is kept constant and the
unit information cost is varied. As λ increases, the unconditional share of
rationally inattentive travelers on the risky path increases a little while the
share of uninformed travelers decreases due to equilibrium. The overall us-
age of the risky path decreases with λ. The story can be told as this: when
information is more expensive, rationally inattentive travelers are less able to
avoid the risky path on bad days, which worsens the path condition. Since
the uninformed travelers cannot acquire information, the unconditional prob-
ability of uninformed travelers is more sensitive to the bad condition than
the rational inattentive travelers. Therefore, the uninformed travelers move
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Figure 13: Flow distribution
the other way to avoid the high cost on bad days. Due to equilibrium, the
rational inattentive travelers use the risky path more.
In the one-link network of Emmerink et al. (1998), both the uninformed
travelers and informed travelers use the path more due to information. Our
results is slightly different from theirs, possibly resulting from assumptions
of demand and supply functions. In their one-link network, there is no equi-
librium considered. Instead, they used a linear demand function. But one
thing in common is that the information increases the usage of the variable
path. In the right panel, it is interesting to observe that the unconditional
probability of choosing path 2 increases with the percentage of uninformed
travelers δ for both uninformed and rational inattentive travelers while the
total usage of path 2 decreases with δ. This may seem contradictory but
note that P2 = P
un
2 ∗ δ+P
RI
2 ∗ (1− δ), where P
un
2 and P
RI
2 is the probability
of choosing the risky path for uninformed and rational inattentive travelers,
respectively. As δ increases, some travelers change from PRI2 to P
un
2 . Al-
though P un2 is increasing, it is smaller than P
RI
2 , resulting in the decrease
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Figure 14: Travel time of under different scenarios
in the overall P2. The figure illustrates that as the number of uninformed
travelers decreases, usage of the risky path also decreases. This is because
that travelers are less able to respond to variable traffic conditions.
If travelers could obtain perfect information, then, in equilibrium and in
each state, the two paths would have equal cost. In the rational inattention
model, as travelers have limited information, they cannot react to the capac-
ity changes as well as they would have been able to with perfect information,
so the travel time of the two paths are different when equilibrium is achieved.
The lines in Fig.14 represents different values of λ and δ. The red line rep-
resents the static travel time on path 1 and the other represents the variable
travel time on path 2. As λ decreases, the information is cheaper and the
travelers get more information, the travel time of the two paths are closer
under each states. As δ increases, the uninformed travelers increases and the
cost difference of the two paths are much larger than that with smaller δ.
In summary, information reduces the cost disequilibrium of the two paths,
especially when in extreme cases where the capacity of path 2 is very low or
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Figure 15: Cost sensitivity for λ and δ
high.
Following Proposition 5, the generalized cost of rationally inattentive (RI)
travelers should always be smaller than the uninformed travelers. As the ex-
pected travel cost of uninformed travelers equals tf , they are not sensitive
to δ and λ. Therefore, the information reduces the travel time of rationally
inattentive travelers while keping the expected travel cost of the uninformed
travelers unchanged as tf . Therefore, we can conclude that in this network,
information is always welfare-improving relative to the case with-
out information. However, the welfare improving effect is not monotonic
with the amount of acquired information.
To examine the impact of imperfect information, Fig. 15 shows the gen-
eralized cost for the rationally inattentive (RI) travelers, scaled travel time
cost of all travelers, scaled information cost and scaled total cost including
the travel time cost and information cost. The following formula is used for
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scaling:
v′ =
v − vmin
vmax − vmin
, (18)
where v′ is the scaled value of v. vmin and vmax are the minimum and maxi-
mum of the original value.
In Fig. 15, the upper left panel depicts the generalized total cost for RI
travelers. As mentioned above, the cost of uninformed travelers is tf , which is
15 in this case. When the percentage of the uninformed travelers is not large,
the generalized cost of RI travelers is not very sensitive to δ and λ. Only
when the rationally inattentive travelers is the minority, they have an obvious
advantage over the uninformed travelers. This may be interpreted as follows.
When the information is cheap or the market share of RI travelers is large, the
cost disequilibrium of the two paths are small, which lessens the difference in
the cost between informed and uninformed travelers. When the majority of
travelers are uninformed travelers, the travel time varies in different states,
which allows the RI travelers to take advantage of the information so their
benefit is more obvious.
In the upper right panel, it is interesting to observe that the total travel
time in not monotonic with δ and λ. When the percentage of uninformed
travelers is small, the total travel time decreases with λ, which means that
less information is more preferable for the system. Although we proved that
from the travelers’ perspective, those endowed with information is always
better than those without information. However, the information does not
always reduce the total travel time of the whole system. Lindsey et al. (2014)
explained that such a situation may occur because the shorter path with less
free flow travel time is overused in equilibrium with perfect information.
Similar arguments apply for the case with imperfect information. Only when
the proportion of uninformed traveler is very large (bigger than 0.9), does
the total travel time decrease with λ, meaning that more information brings
benefit to the system. The optimal travel time occurs when both δ and λ
are moderate, illustrating that the system behaves well when there are not
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too many informed travelers and the information cost is not too small. The
lower panels are the total scaled information cost and the scaled total cost.
Comparing the contour of travel time cost and total cost, most of the area
with low cost overlaps. The scaled total cost exhibits similar characteristics as
the scaled travel time cost. From the perspective of the planner, we may not
be able to control the share of uninformed travelers, but we may adjust the
cost or accessibility of information, which is the scaling parameter λ. From
the perspective of a single traveler, obtaining information is always better if
the exogenous conditions are unchanged. However, from the perspective of
the whole network, too much information might not be preferable.
4.3.2 Two stochastic paths
This subsection further examines the impact of imperfect information on so-
cial welfare. Lindsey et al. (2014) stated that perfect information is welfare-
improving if the free flow travel time of the two links are always equal. Under
this condition, the user equilibrium under perfect information coincides with
system optimum (SO). As they did not consider heterogeneous travelers and
imperfect information, we wonder whether the imperfect information is also
beneficial for the network under different composition of travelers and infor-
mation cost. Therefore we adopted similar parameters as in their study. In
this two-link network, both the links are stochastic with two states: good
and bad. The ’good state’ corresponds to the case with large capacity and
vice versa. Parameter values are set as follows: N = 120, t0 = 5, S1B = 20,
S1G = 35, S2B = 25, S2G = 40. The capacity states of the links are indepen-
dent of each other.
As shown in Fig.16, the total travel cost increases monotonically with δ
and λ. That means that in this network where perfect information is welfare-
improving, imperfect information always decreases the total travel cost.
However, information is not always welfare-improving. Lindsey et al.
(2014) found perfect information may be welfare-reducing when the free flow
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Figure 17: Scaled total travel cost
with correlated path capacity
travel times of the two paths are not equal and the capacities are equipropor-
tional (i.e., S1B/S1G = S2B/S2G). In this scenario, the perfect information
may result in the overuse of the path with smaller free flow travel time. We
changed the parameters to: t1 = 5, t2 = 8 S1B = 30, S1G = 40, S2B = 37.5,
S2G = 50, where the states are perfectly correlated, meaning that if path
1 is in ’bad condition’, the path 2 if in ’bad condition’ as well. The scaled
total travel time is depicted in Fig.17. We found that the imperfect knowl-
edge is welfare-reducing compared to the case without information as well.
Fig.16 and Fig.17 show the total travel cost with imperfect information in the
network with two stochastic paths are intermediate between the case with
perfect information and without information. Whether the imperfect infor-
mation is welfare-improving or welfare-reducing depends on the impact of
perfect information. In previous section where there is only one variable link
with elastic demand, the information is always welfare-improving but imper-
fect information reduces the total travel cost more than perfect information.
In this section, the impact of imperfect information is more moderate than
the impact of perfect information.
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4.3.3 Network with multiple OD pairs
In this subsection, we adopt the Nguyen-Dupius (ND) network to elaborate
the differences between the proposed RIUE model and traditional stochastic
user equilibrium (SUE) model.
Before presenting the results, we need to clarify the differences between
SUE and RIUE conceptually. In SUE, the source of randomness is travel-
ers’ perception error of the travel cost. The network itself is deterministic.
In contrast, RIUE works with a stochastic network in which the link traffic
states are captured by a probability distribution. Travelers obtain informa-
tion about which state would prevail in a probabilistic sense. However, since
the information is imperfect, their knowledge about the travel cost is biased
depending on the information strategy they choose. Unlike SUE in which
the random error is exogenously given, the bias of knowledge in RIUE is
endogenously determined by the unit information cost.
As the SUE model cannot accommodate the degradable or stochastic
network, the link capacity for the variable links are set as their average
capacity for the SUE calculation. For comparison purposes, the travelers are
homogeneous in their information cost. The proportion of each path to be
chosen is given by
p (a) =
exp(−θc(a))∑
a′
exp(−θc(a′))
, (19)
where θ is the sensitivity parameter of path cost. Larger θ represents higher
cost sensitivity.
Fig.18 shows the layout of the ND network. The solid lines represent the
links with fixed capacity. The dashed lines represent the degradable links
whose capacity is variable and captured by 5 possible states. The states of
different links are independent and each state has the same probability of
occurrence. The states can be interpreted as the 5 levels of service (LOS)
from A to E in a highway capacity manual(Manual, 2000). The A,B,C,D,E
levels, respectively, correspond to 100%, 90%, 80%, 70%, 60% of the design
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capacity of each link. There are 2 OD pairs, which are 1-2 and 4-3. Each
OD pair has the demand of 1500.
Figure 18: The Nguyen-Dupius network
Table 4 and Table 5 enumerate the links and paths, respectively. The
path flows of RIUE and SUE are presented in Table 6. Since the path flows
in RIUE are state-dependent, we can only illustrate the average path flows
across all the states. We note that they are not the actual path flows in
the RIUE model, but are computed for comparison with other models only.
We can observe that paths 11, 13 16 are almost dominated by other paths.
Therefore they are not in the consideration set of the RIUE model, especially
when λ is small so travelers are more aware of the cost difference between
the paths. It is not contradictory to the result of Fig.7 because in that case
there is no clear trend of dominance relationship. Comparing the results of
RIUE and SUE, we can see that the flow patterns are different from each
other. For the path that has a larger probability to produce the smallest
travel cost, the RIUE model places much more traffic flow on it than the
SUE model (See paths 5 and 17 for example). As RIUE can capture the
traffic patterns under different traffic states, it is more flexible and arguably
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Table 4: Desired capacity and free flow travel time of each link
Link Capacity t0 Link Capacity t0
1-5 1000 10 8-2 1000 10
1-12 1000 10 9-10 1000 10
4-5 1000 10 9-13 1000 15
4-9 1000 18 10-11 1000 10
5-6 1000 10 10-13 1000 10
5-9 1000 10 11-2 1000 10
6-7 1000 10 11-3 1000 10
6-10 1000 10 12-6 1000 10
7-8 1000 10 12-8 1000 25
7-11 1000 10 13-3 1000 15
more realistic to represent the actual traffic flow in a real-world setting under
the impact of information.
5 Conclusion and discussion
This paper has set up a rational inattention model for the path choice prob-
lem where the travel time is uncertain. The rational inattention model has
the very attractive feature that it incorporates travelers’ information strategy
endogenously, taking into account that travelers choose how much informa-
tion to possess before making the route choice. It relaxes the assumption in
previous research where the information is exogenously given. Based on the
framework of the rational inattention model, the impact of imperfect infor-
mation is extensively studied. In the path choice problem of a single traveler,
we showed that the size of the consideration set decreases with unit infor-
mation cost. A path with large expected cost will not be considered, even
it has a large chance of being the shortest path. The posterior probability
to choose the best path and the total travel cost decrease with information
cost, which illustrates that the information is helpful for travelers to react to
the travel time uncertainty.
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Table 5: Path Enumeration
Path ID Node sequence
1 1-5-6-7-8-2
2 1-5-6-7-11-2
3 1-5-6-10-11-2
4 1-5-9-10-11-2
5 1-12-6-7-8-2
6 1-12-6-7-11-2
7 1-12-6-10-11-2
8 1-12-8-2
9 4-5-6-7-11-3
10 4-5-6-10-11-3
11 4-5-6-10-13-3
12 4-5-9-10-11-3
13 4-5-9-10-13-3
14 4-5-9-13-3
15 4-9-10-11-3
16 4-9-10-13-3
17 4-9-13-3
We have further extended the rational inattention model to a network
with heterogeneous travelers where the rationally inattentive user equilib-
rium (RIUE) is considered. The existence and uniqueness of the solution
is discussed and some properties of RIUE are presented. In the numerical
study, a two-link network with different settings is adopted to examine the
impact of imperfect information, from both the perspective of travelers and
the system total travel cost. Compared to the case without information,
imperfect information is always beneficial in the case with a freeway and an
arterial road. In the network with two variable links, imperfect information
may be welfare-improving or welfare-reducing.
There are some limitations of the proposed model. First of all, the pro-
posed RIUE solution algorithm is path-based, which is computationally inef-
ficient for large-size networks. Developing a link-based algorithm is essential
for working with real-case networks, especially those with a large number of
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Table 6: Average path flow of RIUE and SUE
Path ID RIUE RIUE SUE SUE
λ = 10 λ = 1 θ = 10 θ = 1
1 242.5 46.4 272.6 233.1
2 112.2 110.0 110.5 142.9
3 141.6 212.3 144.6 142.4
4 181.7 324.7 189.4 174.9
5 370.2 608.2 399.9 315.7
6 167.7 84.8 162.2 193.5
7 204.7 64.0 212.1 192.8
8 79.4 49.6 8.8 104.6
9 73.3 133.7 62.3 96.0
10 81.2 157.1 81.5 95.6
11 0.5 0.0 0.0 4.6
12 102.5 178.9 106.7 117.4
13 0.6 0.0 0.0 5.7
14 257.2 47.3 276.8 278.6
15 256.5 46.0 270.7 263.7
16 1.2 0.0 0.0 12.7
17 727.0 937.0 702.0 625.7
states and links. Second, while the model captures the effect of imperfect
information, the information cost λ needs empirical data for calibration. In-
formation cost parameter calibration is not yet well investigated for rational
inattention models. An initial idea to estimate the parameter λ is to make
use the relationship between the conditional probability p(a) and λ. If the
contingent dataset about the capacity, traffic flow, and demand over a large
number of days is collected, we can calculate and estimate the parameter
via a statistical estimation method such as maximum likelihood estimation.
Parameter estimation of the model is beyond the scope of this paper, but is
an important future research topic.
There are many interesting questions beyond this model. We might use
the rational inattention model to determine consideration sets. As many
researchers have investigated, some travelers exhibit route choice inertia in
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network equilibrium (Zhang and Yang, 2015). The consideration of informa-
tion cost may partly explain the inertia as travelers do not want to waste their
information acquisition on inferior routes with long travel times. The results
of the rational inattention model can also be compared with the determinis-
tic model and the logit model. In the deterministic model, each used route
has exactly the same travel time. In the logit model, even a path with large
travel time will still be used. The rational inattention model can produce
more reasonable results than these two models. It allows cost differences
among the used paths and it will eliminate some routes from the consid-
eration set. Another issue is the empirical studies and calibration of unit
information cost. Currently there are not many empirical studies employing
the rational inattention model. It is meaningful to analyze the data of travel
time, departure time, route choice to validate the rational inattention model
for future prediction. Another issue for future research is the formulation of
link-based rational inattention route choice models.
This study might be incorporated with other route choice studies con-
cerning the risk attitudes of travellers where the travel cost not only consists
the travel time but also the travel budget, schedule cost and etc. In summary,
the rational inattention model is very attractive for studying the impact of
information on travelling behavior.
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